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DİNİ YAYINCILIK VE ADNAN OKTAR’IN A9 TV’SİNİN 
"FANTASTİK" TELE-EVRENİ 
Öz 
Türkiye'de dini yayıncılık bugüne kadarki en parlak evresini yaşamaktadır. Ancak diğer dini medyadan 
farklı olarak ve sunduğu çeşitliliğe rağmen, hala yeterince incelenmemiş bir alandır. Bu makale, dini 
yayıncılığın formlarından biri olan televanjelizmi, Adnan Oktar'ın A9 TV kanalına yakından bakarak 
çözümlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Adnan Oktar'ın televangelist pratiğinin dini yayıncılığın marjininde 
durduğunu ve diğer İslami televangelistlerden birçok yönüyle ayrıldığını savunuyorum. Bu makalede, 
Adnan Oktar'ın televangelist pratiğini hem görsel hem de söylemsel açıdan çözümlüyorum. 
Anahtar Terimler 
televanjelizm, dini yayıncılık, kült, popüler İslam, Türk televizyonu.  
 
The Relevance of Studying Religious Broadcasting in Contemporary Turkey 
The rise of Islam in the current global political context is an evident phenomenon. As 
pointed out by Kılıçbay and Binark (2002) more than a decade ago, Islam has gained a 
new form of visibility in the popular realm in Turkey, and they distinguish two 
particular aspects of the popularisation of Islam: ‘the emergence of Islamist media and 
the rise of new consumption patterns’ (p. 497). Although Islamic media—radio, 
newspapers and magazines in particular—have gained academic scrutiny in Turkey 
(Arat, 1995; Kılıçbay and Binark, 2002; Azak, 2013; Meşe, 2015), Islamic broadcasting 
still remains under-investigated despite its over a decade-long history (Öncü, 1995; Erol 
Işık, 2013; Yörük, 2014). This paper explores the long-neglected topic of religious 
broadcasting through the case of Adnan Oktar's televangelist practice on A9 TV. 
One can distinguish three main forms of religious broadcasting in Turkey. The 
first is public broadcasting. Currently, the TRT Diyanet channel, which is run by the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, is distinguished in terms of the ways in which it 
promotes the official understanding of Islam. Secondly, there are stations such as TGRT, 
Kanal 7, and Samanyolu TV, commercial channels which, at the beginning, had Islamist 
undertones but then became more explicit by employing, for example, veiled presenters 
or having religious talk shows and dramas. While TGRT has been closed down for 
financial reasons, the administration of both Kanal 7 and Samanyolu TV has recently 
been passed to a public trustee which has imposed some changes to the channels' policy 
because of the on-going tension between the current government and the Fettullah 
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Gulen movement running the stations. Thirdly, there are the devout religious channels 
operating through satellite broadcasting such as Mehtap TV, Dost TV, Hilal TV, and 
Semerkand TV, each related to a different sect, organisation or Islamic movement. All 
these stations are explicitly committed to Islamic values and strongly emphasise the 
oral tradition in Islam and the power of preaching, talk, religious sagas, pious tales and 
sohbet (conversation), which will be discussed in more detail below. 
The rise of religious broadcasting in Turkey can be placed within the broader 
context of the commodification of religion, and the emergence of new religious 
movements and their use of internet and satellite broadcasting technologies. Even 
though these both stem from the fact that Islam has gained more visibility in the public 
sphere during the last fifteen years in Turkey, religious broadcasting must be 
distinguished from the rising pious content on television in general, e.g. in dramas, 
children's programmes and talk shows. This is because, unlike the piety exhibited on 
mainstream television, religious channels can be regarded as a form of thematic 
broadcasting with a particular commitment to religious themes, values and topics. 
This article uses a cultural perspective to understand the cult1 of Adnan Oktar, 
offering a ‘serious’ approach to a phenomenon which has been much ridiculed. 
Employing discourse analysis method, I will focus on both visual and discursive aspects 
of Adnan Oktar's show, Sohbetler, which is very central to A9 TV's programme flow. The 
analysis includes fifteen randomly chosen episodes of the programme. Sohbetler has 
been broadcast on different time slots, and the length of the programme is usually over 
100 minutes. In addition to watching Sohbetler, I also benefited from the transcripts of 
the show which are available on A9 TV's website. My aim is to discuss the ways in 
                                                     
1 There is a significant body of literature on cults and religious movements. Although it would be very useful, I am 
unable to discuss in-depth in this paper the ways in which to address Adnan Oktar and his group as a cult. Following 
Demetrah’s (2003) delineation of the characteristics of a cult as (1) submission to charismatic leadership, (2) 
communal and/or familiaristic detachment, (3) fusion of private selves with collective identities, (4) control through 
socialised ideology and morality, and (5) affirmation through shared ultimate experiences, I argue that we can define 
Adnan Oktar and his followers as a cult. As a term, ‘cult’ has been overwhelmed by the negative denotations 
attached to it, and thus many scholars prefer to call such groups with the aforementioned characteristics as new 
religious movements. Beckford (2003, p. 27) draws our attention to the fact that particular qualities which have been 
attributed to cults such as ‘exploitation, authoritarian leadership, harassment and abuse, systematic fraud and 
deception, violence and patriarchy’ are also true for other legitimated forms of religion and religious collectivities. On 
the other hand, ‘cult’ (kült) has often falsely been addressed as ‘sect’ (tarikat) and has not widely been used in the 
Turkish context. I choose to employ the term ‘cult’ in order to emphasise its difference from a sect and also for 
etymological reasons as the term implies the significance of group formation and identity due to its ‘semantic 
company’ with the word ‘culture’. This is in accordance with the cultural perspective that this paper provides for 
understanding the Adnan Oktar phenomenon: ‘Thus, just as cultures can—and perhaps must—be regarded as cultic, 
cults—even more than most other collectivities—require an acute version of the same enveloping sense of the sacred 
that Durkheim finds in culture generally.’ (Demetrah, 2003, p. 27). 
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which the cult of Adnan Oktar employs television as a platform to disseminate its 
particular values and principles derived from Islam by means of a particular form of 
televangelism. Islamic televangelism on Turkish television has shifted from the ‘secular’ 
perspective of Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (Öncü, 1995) towards a more devout Islamist one as 
exemplified by televangelists such as Ömer Döngeloğlu and Nihat Hatipoğlu. Adnan 
Oktar’s televangelism on A9 TV, however, is particularly interesting as it stands where 
the marginal religious practice of a cult meets with the popular realm of television. 
Following Moll (2010, p. 20), I argue that television in contemporary Turkey can be 
regarded as a ‘“technology of piety” where it weaves its magic through pleasures and 
subliminal framings’, and as such has been a technology of nation-building in Egypt 
(Abu-Lughod, 2004, p. 9), Turkey and elsewhere.  
The Relevance of Studying Islamic Televangelism: Forms and Discourses 
Televangelism refers to ‘a new form of religious broadcasting combining television and 
evangelism’ (Musthafa, 2014, p. 14). Televangelism started in the USA in the 1960s 
where it was mostly related to local churches (Thomas and Lee, 2012; Howell, 2014), 
whereas today, it describes a diversity of religious practices on television across 
different religions including Hinduism, Islam and many others. In other words, ‘today 
televangelism is a global, cross-religious phenomenon’ (Thomas and Lee, 2012, p. 2). 
According to Musthafa (2014, p. 15) ‘the term televangelist refers to Christian 
propagators who take donations from wealthy followers (Hadden & Shupe 1987) while 
Islamic evangelism refers to the modern form of Islamic propagation of both religious 
principles and Islamic values in day-to-day life (Larkin 2008)’. Jameel (2013) adds that 
while Christian televangelism remains at the margins of broadcasting and is celebrated 
by a particular group of viewers, Islamic televangelism is gradually becoming 
mainstream and expanding its target audience. Indeed, Islamic televangelist practice 
has been embraced by viewers in many different countries such as Egypt (Moll, 2010, 
2012), Indonesia (Muzakki, 2012; Howell, 2014), Malaysia, India and Pakistan; and 
further, the appeal of particular Muslim televangelists such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
known as the ‘Global Mufti’, and Amr Khaled now reach beyond national borders, 
creating a transnational sphere for the broader Ummah of Muslims (Moll, 2012; Sharify-
Funk and Albarghouti, 2013).  
From a cultural perspective, one can distinguish particular dynamics that define 
the characteristics of Islamic televangelism. Firstly, the institutionalisation of Islam 
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within a particular country in which televangelist broadcasting takes place has a 
significant impact on the emergence of religious personalities as televangelists. Official 
institutions such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey and more informal 
forms of religious recruitment by Islamic groups, sects and organisations have led to 
different televisual practices of production and reception. Eventually, this means that 
different styles and different personalities from various backgrounds can appear on 
television in the form of Islamic televangelism. Secondly, the regulation of television 
broadcasting and conditions in the broadcasting market also have a significant impact 
on religious broadcasting. For instance, in Indonesia, the fall of the Suharto regime led 
to the deregulation of the media, and the search for innovation by private television 
resulted in the introduction of new genres in religious television programming such as 
talk shows (Howell, 2014, p. 237). Similarly, Echchaibi (2011, p. 92) identifies a break in 
the representation of Islam on Arab television due to a significant change in the 
conditions of television production, marked by the start of Amr Khaled’s show Words 
From the Hearth in 2000, whereas before television studios had appeared as an extension 
of the mosque. Khaled’s and his successors’ pragmatic approach helped them to 
address everyday life beyond the helal/haram (licit/illicit) opposition and to appeal to a 
broader audience with their ‘not simply preachy, compassionate, and inclusive, not 
punitive and exclusive, and critically embracing-not squarely denouncing the material 
world’ (Echchaibi, 2011, p. 95). Thirdly, both the religious and televisual cultural context 
in which the programmes produced are also distinctive in terms of the form of the 
programme content. The last decade of Turkish television has seen the rise of piety in 
both the factual and fictional content in mainstream broadcasting (Emre Cetin, 2014) 
along with the appearance of new religious television channels in the Turkish television 
market. The rise of television as the ‘technology of piety’ evidently owes much to the 
broader social context in which Islamic values and practices become much more visible 
and popular in Turkey. 
There are also significant consequences of employing television as the 
‘technology of piety’ in return. Particular advancements in television technology has led 
to the increasing visibility of Islam as well as the diversity and fragmentation of Islamic 
representations on television. The new media technologies such as satellite television 
have led to the ‘“fragmentation” of religious authority in Muslim societies’ as well as 
the audience (Moll, 2012, p. 22). Hence, the global phenomenon of televangelism 
implicitly indicates small groups of viewers who are geographically dispersed on one 
hand and a diversity of religious interpretations and authorities who appear on 
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television on the other. While the everyday televisual appearance of religious 
personalities challenges the authority of existing religious institutions, it also means the 
emergence of new religious authorities within the realm of popular culture. Sharify-
Funk and Albarghouti (2013, p. 506-7) state that ‘Muslim transnationalism has opened 
new doors for participating in public discourse, facilitating the emergence of new 
religious authorities that compete with the traditional ulama’. In a similar vein, 
Muzakki (2012, p. 60) regards this process of the increasing self-autonomy of religious 
authorities and the decreasing authority of religious institutions in Indonesia as a 
‘logical consequence of growing production, capitalization and mass marketization of 
Islamic ideas through the television industry’. This takes us to Göle's (1997, p. 77) 
argument that ‘there is a compound relationship between the identity politics of Islamic 
communities and the global forces of consumerism and of market economics’. It is not 
possible to think of popular forms or everyday practices of Islam such as televangelism 
without any reference to the neoliberal market economy in which commodification and 
mediated forms of religion greatly appeal to pious people. Despite the assumption that 
Christianity is the religion of the ‘visual’ and Islam is the one of the ‘oral’, Moll (2010, 
p.3-4) argues that recent televangelist practices challenge this ‘easy bifurcation’, and 
currently, one must take the visual forms of preaching into account in order to be able 
to address the contemporary dimensions of the consumption and commodification of 
religion. Following this point, my analysis of Adnan Oktar's televangelist practice 
addresses both visual and discursive domains. However, it is important to note that the 
visual representation of Oktar's cult holds a particular significance among other Islamic 
representations on television as discussed below. 
Studying Islamic Televangelism Islamic Cult and Televangelist Practice: Adnan 
Oktar and A9 TV 
It has been difficult to gain an insight into a religious cult because of its closed 
organisational form, except for the testimonials of previous members. But cults also aim 
to recruit more people in order to gain power and expand their field of impact, and in 
this way, new media technologies contribute towards the visibility of religious cults by 
making them more accessible to a broader public. This is the case with Adnan Oktar's 
cult. Adnan Oktar and his followers recruit through the Science Research Foundation 
(Bilim Araştırma Vakfı) which, since the 1990s, organises conferences, and publishes 
and disseminates Oktar’s books, of which there are more than three hundred, on 
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Ataturk and creationism. Oktar was arrested in the late 1980s but was given immunity 
against criminal prosecution because of his mental illness. Despite this immunity, he 
has been sued by previous members of the cult, some of whom were celebrities. Adnan 
Oktar is known to recruit young, good-looking, well-educated and affluent people to 
his cult and to pursue an extravagant lifestyle with his members. The cult started their 
satellite broadcasting on A9 TV in 2011 since when Oktar and his ideas have held a 
central position in the channel's schedule. The channel broadcasts in Turkish although 
an English simultaneous translation is available online via the channel’s webpage. 
It should be noted that Adnan Oktar was a media phenomenon before his 
television broadcasting because of the scandalous legal cases involving his previous 
followers such as models and a medical professor and the professor’s family. It was not 
only the usual moral panic and public anxiety that generally frames cults but also these 
legal cases that provided interesting stories for the mainstream media. While Oktar has 
been subject to various accusations of the economic, psychological and sexual abuse of 
his followers in Turkey, he has also come to the attention of the media abroad because 
of his commitment to creationism and his dispute with the evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins.2 Hence the public profile of Adnan Oktar is a complex one born out 
of litigation, accusations, speculations by various parties, controversial ideas on 
evolution, and a lavish lifestyle. 
Such as his peculiar public profile which is very different from other sect leaders 
and religious authorities in Turkey, there are several ways in which Oktar’s religious 
broadcasting is different from other forms of Islamic televangelism. For instance, unlike 
Amr Khaled or Nihat Hatipoğlu, Oktar does not give long talks on Islam or the Koran 
to male Muslims gathered in a studio or a hall. Oktar’s televangelist practice takes place 
in a home-like studio where he gathers together a gender-mixed group of his cult 
members to have a conversation with them. He does not answer questions from a hall 
full of people like Zakir Naikm, nor does he discuss his interpretation of the Koran with 
a presenter such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi or Yaşar Nuri Öztürk. Neither are the topics 
discussed by Oktar limited to Islam but vary as he comments on current affairs and 
contemporary politics. This largely stems from the fact that Oktar is a cult leader rather 
than an Imam in the conventional sense of the term, and that he holds neither an 
                                                     
2 See https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2008/aug/19/richarddawkinsisusedto and 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2008/dec/22/atlas-creationism-adnan-oktar-harun-yahya 
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officially or socially recognised religious status that would enable him to preach and 
discuss Islam in a conventional way.  
Interestingly, however, there is a particular feature of Oktar’s televangelism that 
resembles a Christian televangelist: his obsession with Charles Darwin and his theory of 
evolution. Oktar has written several books from a creationist perspective to 
demonstrate the fallacy of Darwin’s theory which have been translated into various 
languages and are donated free in Turkey and abroad to public schools, libraries and 
individuals.3 He has organised various conferences in Turkey and abroad to publicise 
his books and disseminate his anti-Darwinist ideas. This is echoed in his television 
broadcasting where he and his followers provide ‘evidences of creation’ from the Koran 
and ‘scientific sources’. The credits of his primary programme on A9 TV, Sohbetler with 
Adnan Oktar, visualizes anti-evolutionism in the form of a stone that smashes the statue 
of Darwin after it has passed through the museum of (anti?-)evolution.  
Newspapers that depicted the scandals in the past, and lately his television 
broadcasting, have contributed a great deal to the making of the public image of Adnan 
Oktar and his followers. Rather than an Islamic cult, Oktar's cult is more reminiscent of 
a hedonistic subculture where its members indulge themselves in conspicuous 
consumption and various sorts of worldly pleasures. In the following sub-sections, I 
shall look at both the discursive and visual construction of this televisual ‘universe’ 
which embodies Oktar's public persona and his Islamic cult. 
Turkish-Islamic morality and the utopian notion of unification 
The programme schedule of A9 TV, which defines its main broadcasting policy as 
‘serving the settlement of peace in Turkey and in the world with the unifying style of 
Turkish-Islamic morality’, is predominantly based on talk-shows and documentaries. 
Not surprisingly, despite the thematic diversity of the talk-shows, including politics and 
various aspects of everyday life, the discursive framework is constructed from the 
perspective of a Turkish-Islamic morality. It is a moral standard that is to be achieved 
through Turkishness and the Koran (despite the challenges of modern life), and the 
pursuit of the ideal of Islamic unification or Ummah. Oktar and the participants in 
Sohbetler with Adnan Oktar, along with the presenters in Başkent Birikimleri and Birlik 
Zamanı, largely endeavour to make contemporary links with the Koran in order to 
interpret current affairs and problems from the perspective of Islam. Similar to other 
                                                     
3 See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-islam-creationism-france-idUSTRE74F3GC20110516 
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contemporary Muslim preachers, they mediate ‘between tradition and modernity as 
well as the spiritual and materialistic’ (Musthafa, 2014, p. 15). This is where Oktar’s 
anti-Darwinism comes into play: he and his followers often claim that contemporary 
discoveries and inventions attributed to modern science are already mentioned in the 
Koran, and hence science does not contradict religion but is rather evidence of its 
relevance. If one reads the Koran properly, a person can find anything that they look for 
in order to make sense of the contemporary world.  
Since Oktar's programme is very much engaged with contemporary politics in 
Turkey, the Kurdish question is the basic topic of his conversation with his followers in 
which he employs a Turkish-Islamic unification framework. This framework is not 
original and is no different from what is known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Oktar 
often quotes the Koran while discussing the Kurdish question, and in doing so equates 
the members of the Kurdish organisation, the PKK, with atheists and polytheists. In a 
way, he re-interprets a contemporary question within the light of Islam. 
Both the name of Oktar's main programme, Sohbetler, and the programme’s style 
that resembles a forum in which the members have the right to participate ‘equally’ but 
respectfully to the leader and other participants, indicate an alignment with Islamic oral 
tradition and the term sohbet: 
The term sohbet is used in modern, every day Turkish to mean 
‘conversation’. But in classical sources it has a more nuanced meaning of 
companionship, including shades of fellowship and discipleship 
(Trimingham, 1998: 311). There is a sense among Sufis that companionship 
is linked intimately to conversation, and conversely that conversation 
engenders companionship. The term ‘sohbet’ itself derives from the same 
Arabic root as the word ‘sahaba’, companions, and the terms participate in 
the same semantic extension. Sohbet is what, by definition, companions do. 
The figure of the companion in Islam is modelled on the Companions of 
the Prophet, those who were closest to the Prophet during his lifetime, 
sought out and frequently kept his company, and strove to assimilate his 
teachings. The Companions’ significance can hardly be overstated, since it 
was they who transmitted the hadith and the Quran before these were 
written down and compiled, ensuring a critical structural role for 
companionship and face-to-face speech in Islamic disciplines (Silverstein, 
2007, p. 43). 
That is to say, sohbet operates as a way of conveying the sense of belonging to a 
community and strengthens the ideal of companionship. It is important to note that 
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talk-show is the television genre that fits best with the Sufi tradition of sohbet. Unlike 
that of Amr Khaled or Zakir Naik, Adnan Oktar’s televangelist practice is based on 
conversation rather than preaching. This is also evident in his friendly and humorous 
way of talking to his followers unlike the style of his much more ‘serious’ counterparts. 
However, in practice Adnan Oktar's sohbet is not a conversation amongst equals as his 
followers are rather submissive and disapproval or criticism of the leader is out of 
question in this ‘harmonious’ group.  
Oktar's emphasis on Turkish-Islamic morality and the unification of the Ummah, 
which is a reflection of ‘high morals’, can be taken as an implicit criticism of the current 
practices of Islam. Oktar's cult presents itself as the ideal form, a constructive kernel, 
upon which Islam can rejuvenate and update itself in accordance with the complexities 
of the contemporary world. Oktar often criticises the misdeeds of radical Islamic groups 
and addresses them as orthodox Islamists who are unable to grasp the prerequisites of 
the contemporary world: 
You need to explain the traditionalist Islam in order for them [people] to see 
its danger. Extensive caution must be taken [against traditionalist Islamists]. 
Sohbetler, episode on 22 March 2016. 
It is important to highlight that there is no place for what Oktar calls ‘orthodox Islamists’ 
in his utopian notion of unification since Islamic unification can include those who are 
good Muslims although yet unaware of the true ways of practising Islam.  
For Oktar, the utopia of unification can come true with the leadership of a Mehdi (a 
saviour) who will come to earth in order to establish an Islamic order, an implicit 
reference to Oktar himself as the saviour of the Ummah. This implicit claim is not specific 
to Oktar but is adopted by many sheikhs and cult and sect leaders in Turkey. It can be 
regarded as a desire for religious authority especially where the leader lacks any formal 
or traditional forms of religious education. In addition, the Mehdi as saviour invites the 
fantasies of a male hero who is the forerunner of heaven and eternity. Notably, utopian 
notions are not specific to Oktar's televangelism. For example, during the uprisings 
known as the Arab Spring, Amr Khaled, Mustafa Hosni and Moez Masoud were to 
‘frame Tahrir Square as an exemplar of a “New Egypt”, a utopian space where free 
expression, social equality, gender parity, religious harmony and an overall sense of 
order and organization reigned for 18 days’ (Moll, 2012; 2013, para.1). But unlike the 
revivalist notions of utopia by Egyptian televangelists, Oktar's discourse is in accord 
with A9 TV's main broadcasting policy that promulgates the notion of Turkish-Islamic 
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morality, and he is deeply committed to the conspiracy theories of Turkish nationalism 
as he accuses British Intelligence, the PKK and communists of organising hidden plots 
against Turkey. These appear very often in his programme and his social media 
pronouncements: 
For instance, if Norway is divided, it won't be a big problem. But Turkey is 
the brain of the universe of Turkishness [Turkic countries], it is connected 
to them with an organic bond. If Turkey dies, the universe of Turkishness 
dies. It is also the brain of the Islamic universe [Muslim countries]. If 
Turkey dies, the Islamic universe would be ruined. Sohbetler, episode on 13 
January 2016. 
Visual extravagancy and creating the pornographic race of women 
Oktar's sohbet programmes and other talk shows on the A9 TV channel take place in an 
extravagantly decorated studio where the members of his cult often serve as the ‘décor’. 
That is not to say that Oktar's followers do not participate in the sohbet or actively 
engage in creating the atmosphere of the programme, rather it is argued that the 
members of the cult are diligently prepared to contribute towards the visualisation of 
the sumptuous atmosphere of the programme through their lavish attire. Oktar admits 
that this worked-on visual image serves a particular purpose:  
For instance everything is lavish here... Bottles, glasses, furniture and so 
on... This is to cheer people up... Men are handsome for instance, women 
are beautiful [here]... People already see ugly faces, many of them in many 
places... Ragged people, desperate people...  Sohbetler, episode on 7 
December 2015. 
The lavish lifestyle promoted by the cult is also evident in the dress style of Oktar and 
his followers. Unlike other Islamic televangelists, Oktar wears stylish, expensive suits 
and encourages his followers to do likewise. He often comments during Sohbetler on the 
clothing of the members and also on the make-up of the female followers, and praises 
‘tasteful’ choices. In this regard, the sexuality of the female members is not something 
that men must resist or deny, but rather is part of the ‘aesthetic’ of life and its beauty: 
They don't think that joy, fun can exist together with religion (Islam). 
Religion and laughing, religion and low-cut dresses, religion and art, 
religion and painting, religion and sculpture, namely anything nice in life 
cannot be thought as part of religion, they believe. (...) Religion is a system 
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which gathers all the beauties in life. There is joy in religion, there is fun in 
religion, there is music, ladies feel comfortable... Women (can) wear low-
cut clothes, if she wants to; if she wants, she covers her hair, no one can 
interfere with one another. Sohbetler, episode on 18 March 2015. 
In accordance with its extravagant visual quality, Oktar's Sohbetler plays out through a 
rather ‘grotesque’ format. Oktar expresses his opinion on a contemporary political 
topic, then plays a song from his laptop to his followers who tap, clap or dance, after 
which one of the followers provides ‘evidence of creation’ based on an example from 
the plant or animal kingdom, followed by a video in which the followers re-stage a 
scene from a Turkish melodrama for entertainment, and so on.  
What is distinctive about 
Oktar's Islamic cult is the fact that 
female members of the cult are 
unveiled and frequently have an 
artificial look with their silicon gel 
lips, breast implants, bleach-dyed hair 
and extravagant make-up. Many of 
the previous and current members of 
the cult are known to be professional 
models. Addressed as kedicikler (pussy 
cats) by Oktar, female members of the 
cult clearly flirt and make 
compliments to him both in the 
programme and on social media 
while many of the female members 
flatter Oktar's physical appearance 
and call him ‘darling’ (sevgili). All of 
this reinforces the fantasies of the harem and houris in heaven. One can argue that 
Oktar's community on television embodies the promise of heaven containing all sorts of 
earthly pleasures and opportunities available to Muslims who are willing to join them. 
The fruit bowl placed on Oktar’s side table and the drinks in different bottles and 
glasses resembling those from which alcohol is served on the tables of the members also 
contribute towards the economy of pleasure provided by the Sohbetler programme. In 
Adnan Oktar’s profile picture on his personal twitter 
account with an ‘unusual’ outlook as a religious 
authority.  
Accessed at: https://twitter.com/adnan_oktar 
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other words, Oktar's sohbet not only appeals to the heart and the soul but also aims at 
mobilising bodily pleasures.  
Despite its liberal discourse on the value of women in society, the re-making of 
the female members’ bodies through cosmetic surgery implies the strong will and 
control exercised by Oktar and the male members alongside the strong commitment of 
female members to the aesthetic criteria of the cult. While this cult trains souls and fills 
them with love of Islam on one hand, it also re-shapes the bodies of female members in 
particular on the other. In that sense, the female body marks the borders of Oktar's cult 
in terms of group identity and membership.  
The centrality of the 
female body and sexuality in 
drawing the boundaries of 
religious practice is not specific 
to Oktar's cult. The veil has 
long stood as an indicator of 
the boundary of the public 
sphere in Turkey (Göle, 1997). 
However, Adnan Oktar's cult is 
peculiar in terms of the ways in 
which sexuality is regarded as 
a recruiting tool to attract 
potential members and to paint 
a positive public image. This is 
unlike the situation with other 
cult leaders, such as Müslüm 
Gündüz4 and Hüseyin Üzmez5, 
where sexuality and sexual conduct proved to be a challenge that led to the collapse of 
their religious authority as it focused light on the moral boundary between the inside 
                                                     
4 On 26 December 1996, the leader of the radical Islamist sect, Aczmendis, Müslüm Gündüz was reported in the 
media to have committed adultery with Fadime Şahin in Istanbul. This incident was widely construed to be part of a 
pre-organised media campaign used to build public opinion against radical Islamists and to create a legitimate 
reason for the imminent military intervention on 28 February 1997. 
5 Hüseyin Üzmez, a columnist on the renowned Islamist newspaper, Vakit, was accused of raping a 14-year-old girl 
and arrested in 2008. The girl's mother was also charged because it was claimed that she forced her daughter to 
engage in sexual intercourse with Üzmez against her will. His release in 2011 caused uproar from women's and 
children's rights groups. 
Female members of Adnan Oktar’s cult known as ‘pussy cats’.  
Accessed at: 
http://www.internetajans.com/magazin/kediciklerin-sirri-
ortaya-cikti-rtuk-herseyi-acikladi-adnan-oktar-kimdir-
h298936.html 
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and the outside of the group and casted doubt on the leader’s credibility to outsiders. 
This is where television operates as an efficient tool to assure a sense of transparency 
and provide a particular basis for legitimacy through visibility. That is to say, the 
extravagance and emphasis on sexuality complement the televangelist’s discourse and 
invite the audience to share in a particular Muslim brotherhood (and sisterhood?) of 
sexual fantasies and pleasures through the pornographic body image of women.  
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research 
The Turkish broadcasting landscape has rapidly been transformed during the last 
decade and the change from an exclusively ‘secular’ television content, where religion is 
mostly remembered during Ramadan, to a more pious one in which Islam infiltrates its 
various genres is still on-going. In this paper, I have explored a cult leader's 
televangelist practice that is on ‘the margin of the marginal’ in the field of religious 
broadcasting in Turkey, rather than the more usual type of broadcasting embraced by a 
broader audience represented by someone like Nihat Hatipoğlu. Indeed, Turkish 
televangelist practice, as well as Turkish religious broadcasting in general, is awaiting 
the attention of further academic scrutiny.  
Adnan Oktar and his cult indicate the shifting borders of religion, Islam in 
particular, towards more ‘worldly’ and hybrid forms and practices. One can regard this 
‘worldly’ interpretation of religion which is fused by gradually increasing emphasis on 
sexuality and consumption as a way of secularisation and a form of adapting to 
changing social conditions with change of neoliberalism and globalisation. Whether it is 
taken as a way of secularisation or not, television plays an important role in 
dissemination of such religious practices towards a broader audience. The expanding 
Turkish religious broadcasting market remarkably illustrates the extent of which 
television becomes the 'technology of piety' as a platform for everyday encounters with 
religion as well as being a religious practice in itself. 
It is also crucial to address the ways in which viewers receive and interpret 
televangelist practices. Thomas and Lee (2012) highlight that there are only a few 
studies on the viewership of televangelism. This is of particular importance in 
understanding the role of television, as the ‘technology of piety’, in the everyday 
engagement with religious practices and the construction of group identity for Muslims 
or more specifically of different sects. Jouli (2008) shows how pious Turkish women 
migrants in Germany deeply engage with religious programmes on Turkish television, 
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such as Sır Kapısı, and follow Nihat Hatipoğlu's programmes and buy his DVDs, in a 
similar way to Arab migrants who view the programmes of Amr Khaled. This would 
indicate that the Turkish televangelist practice also need to be re-considered in terms of 
transnationalism and diasporic cultures. Moreover, as Thomas and Lee (2012, p. 1) aptly 
put it, ‘televangelism is no longer limited to television but is increasingly a new media 
phenomenon—amplified and shaped on social media sites and accessed by mobile 
technologies in ever more complex circuits of production, distribution, and 
consumption’. This is also the case with Adnan Oktar as he and his followers efficiently 
use social media accounts in line with their broadcasts. Hence, televangelism is no 
longer limited to television but is a media phenomenon, and Adnan Oktar is no 
exception.  
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